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Abstract
Mathematical proofs are both paradigms of certainty and some of the most explicitly-justified
arguments that we have in the cultural record. Their very explicitness, however, leads to a
paradox, because their probability of error grows exponentially as the argument expands.
Here we show that under a cognitively-plausible belief formation mechanism that combines
deductive and abductive reasoning, mathematical arguments can undergo what we call an
epistemic phase transition: a dramatic and rapidly-propagating jump from uncertainty to
near-complete confidence at reasonable levels of claim-to-claim error rates. To show this, we
analyze an unusual dataset of forty-eight machine-aided proofs from the formalized reasoning
system Coq, including major theorems ranging from ancient to 21st Century mathematics,
along with four hand-constructed cases from Euclid, Apollonius, Spinoza, and Andrew Wiles.
Our results bear both on recent work in the history and philosophy of mathematics, and on
a question, basic to cognitive science, of how we form beliefs, and justify them to others.
Mathematical proofs are commonly taken as a gold standard for certainty. How we come to discover, justify,
and believe those proofs, however, is a different matter. In part because the things mathematicians believe
are often remote from direct experience and what can be tested experimentally, the study of mathematical
cognition has the potential to give new insights into the workings of the mind, and is a growing domain of
research in cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience (1–3). At the same time, the explicit and idealized
nature of mathematical proof can also give us insight into a central cultural practice of the modern world,
that of justification via abstract reason-giving (4).
One view of mathematical proofs is that they are at heart specifications for, or summaries of, rule-based
symbol manipulation. In this picture, formalized most famously by Alan Turing (5), proofs specify a sequential,
mechanical process of logical deductions that, operating according to purely syntactic rules, terminates with
a formula corresponding to the thing to be proved.
Taken seriously as an account of mathematical practice, however, this model has many problems. Most
relevant for our work, it implies that mathematical knowledge may be less justified than ordinary beliefs.
This is because, in an argument that goes back to Hume (6), the possibility of errors in a sequential deduction
compounds step by step (7). At an error probability of 10−3, for example, a proof with more than seven
hundred steps is more likely to have failed than not.
Worse yet, mathematicians themselves often go out of their way to disclaim the precision required by the Turing
picture. Henri Poincaré writes, for example, that he is “absolutely incapable of adding without mistakes” (8),
a claim that under standard accounts of mathematical belief bears comparison to a neurosurgeon boasting of
an unsteady hand.
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Even allowing for rhetorical exaggeration, the commonness of sentiments like Poincaré’s among practicing
mathematicians points to additional epistemic processes for both discovery and justification. Mathematicians
describe, for example, posing questions to nature by the checking of cases (9), drawing on abductive or
analogical principles (10, 11), and using intuition and idiom (12).
This paper uses an unusual dataset—machine-aided proof networks—to provide new empirical support for
long-standing qualitative accounts of how proofs lead to belief. We show that mathematical proofs have a
network structure that enables what we refer to as an epistemic phase transition (EPT): informally, while the
truth of any particular path of argument connecting two points decays exponentially in force, the number
of distinct paths increases. Depending on the network structure, the number of distinct paths may itself
increase exponentially, leading to a balance point where influence can propagate at arbitrary distance (13).
In the presence of bidirectional inference—i.e., both deductive and abductive reasoning—an EPT enables
mathematical arguments to achieve near-unity levels of certainty even in the presence of skepticism about the
validity of any particular step. Deductive and abductive reasoning, as we show, must be well-balanced for
this to happen. A relative overconfidence in one over the other can frustrate the effect, a phenomenon we
refer to as the abductive paradox.
We present these results in three parts. We first introduce, and justify, a simple model of belief formation
drawn from the cognitive science literature. We then describe the data sets we apply this model to, and then
present the results of the analysis. Technical details of the implementation can be found in the Materials and
Methods.
1 Model
Our model of belief formation is based in two core features of proofs. First, that while proofs are usually
presented in a linear narrative, most will refer back to the same claims at different places. This turns a linear
deduction into a network of interacting claims. A proof that combines two independent lines of reasoning at
a particular point may be robust to counterexamples that invalidate one of those paths (14): in this way, an
1 − (1 − )2k failure rate may be improved, by orders of magnitude, to (1 − (1 − )k)2. As von Neumann
established in the case of faulty computer logic gates (15), multiple paths in a modular organization can
overcome noise.
Second, that reasoning on the basis of coherence, intuition, or analogy can also support evidentiary flow
“down” from conclusions as well as “up”, deductively, from axioms (16, 17). A proof that 1 + 1 = 2 (18)
helps establish the validity of the axioms and propositions that precede it, rather than resolving lingering
doubts about elementary school arithmetic. A wide consensus on the truth of the Clay Institute’s Millennium
Prize Problems guides the mathematician’s attempts to solve them, providing at least provisional support to
supporting claims (19).
Pólya’s Patterns of Plausible Inference is a famous argument for the importance of this downward direction.
It corresponds to Peircean abduction (20, 21), an epistemic process that now plays a central role in the study
of contemporary mathematical practice (22). Abduction can, of course, be just as fallible as deduction, as
demonstrated by long-standing gaps in proofs of famous theorems such as the Euler characteristic (11), where
the intuitive truth of steps in the proof leads one to neglect flaws in more basic claims, and the historically
unexpected conclusion of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem.
On this basis, we model mathematical belief-formation as the navigation of a network of claims where
evidentiary support includes multiple, potentially bi-directional, pathways. Such networks are also the basic
structures for coherence theories of belief formation in cognitive science (23–25). We emphasise that models
of this form capture the fallible, real-world process of reasoning, not the parallel normative process; the same
network coherence perspective can model both (objectively) true and false beliefs; see, e.g., Ref. (26).
To specify a general model of belief formation on these networks, we invoke three requirements. First, we
require that the degree of belief in any particular claim is (all other things being equal) conditional solely on
its dependencies (the claims that support it in a deductive fashion), and those that depend on it in turn;
we allow for differing strengths of these respectively deductive and abductive pathways. Second, following
standard models in Bayesian cognition, we require this dependency be additive in log-space. Finally, we
require that the model is otherwise unconstrained in the patterns of beliefs that can be formed. Taken
together, these requirements lead to a minimal (27) and unique “maximum entropy” model (see Materials
and Methods), corresponding to a probabilistic version of constraint satisfaction (28, 29). (Such a model
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also provides a framework for extensions to include more complex, synergistic effects; for brevity, we do not
consider them here.)
Despite its simplicity, this model makes three predictions directly relevant to the question at hand. First
that, under certain conditions, the very things that lead to the reliability problem can become a virtue. The
physical analogues of our model are known to undergo phase transitions, where small changes in a control
parameter can lead to (approximately) discontinuous shifts in global properties. Here, in the cognitive domain,
the control parameter corresponds to the local degree of dependency (i.e., how good the reasoner is, or thinks
he is, about drawing the correct conclusion), while the global property is the average degree of belief in a
claim.
The existence of such transitions is sensitive to network structure: they can not happen, for example, for a
linear network, nor indeed for any tree-like network of finite ramification (30). However, when the topological
demands are met, justification becomes easier, not harder, as the network size, N , increases, with—depending
on the structure of the network—a sharp transition to total deductive certainty in the limit of large N .
As mentioned above, this is due to the emergence of multiple paths between any two claims. On the one
hand, error compounds exponentially along any particular path, as it does in any linear chain. On the other,
the number of distinct paths between points can, depending on network structure, grow exponentially (31).
At a critical point, the exponential decay is balanced by the exponential growth, and influence can propagate
undiminished across the entire network (13).
EPTs are a double-edged sword, however, because disbelief can propagate just as easily as truth. A second
prediction of the model is that this difficulty—the explosive spread of skepticism—can be ameliorated by
when the proof is made of modules: groups of claims that are significantly more tightly linked to each other
than to the rest of the network.
When modular structure is present, the certainty of any claim within a cluster is reasonably isolated from the
failure of nodes outside that cluster. This means that a reasoner can come to believe sub-parts of the overall
network without needing to resolve the entire system at once. Such a mechanism is has been hypothesised to
exist in the case of mathematical proofs (32).
Modules can be identified by standard clustering algorithms such as Girvan-Newman (33). The subsequent
robustness can be tested by comparing the relative difficulty of forming a belief within a module compared to
that of forming a belief in an arbitary collection of nodes (see Materials and Methods).
A third prediction of the model concerns the balance of deductive and abductive reasoning. Informally, one
would imagine that increasing confidence in either process would aid the overall confidence in the proof: at
a given level of deductive confidence (say), I can only become more certain by increasing confidence in my
abductive intuitions.
This turns out not to be the case: for a fixed level of deductive confidence, increasing abductive confidence
can lead to lower levels of certainty, and similarly in reverse. This is because, at a critical point, abduction
can come to dominate deduction completely, leading to solely downward propagation and cutting off the
proliferation of paths necessary for the EPT. This destroys a key topological features necessary for a phase
transition: there are now fewer paths of influence between nodes and, for example, theorem “siblings” can no
longer re-enforce each other.
We refer to this as the abductive paradox. Informally, the proof becomes dependent solely on the mathe-
matician’s belief in the conclusion: doubts propagate downwards, and even the best axioms are powerless to
overcome them.
2 Data
In order to determine if real-world mathematical theorems have the necessary properties to trigger the
epistemic effects described in the previous section, we analyze two datasets. First, forty-eight machine-assisted
proofs constructed by mathematicians with the aid of the formal verification system Coq (34), ranging from
the Pythagorean Theorem to the Four-Color Theorem; see Table 1.
Proofs in a formal verification system are constructed by a mathematician who then invokes machine-
implemented heuristics to fill in the gaps. The proofs themselves are interpretable, if exceedingly pendantic;
see Materials and Methods for a proof that the number four is even. We extract the abstract syntax trees
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representing the underlying deductions, and then identify of equivalent claims which turns these trees into
directed acyclic graphs.
This dataset is supplemented with four “human” proofs: the original texts of Euclid’s Geometry, Apollonius’
Conics, and Spinoza’s Ethics (all of which mark explicit dependencies), and a hand-coded network based on a
close-reading of Andrew Wiles’ 1995 proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem (35). Although human networks are
orders of magnitude smaller than those supplemented with the fine-grained deductions of a machine, the
comparison allows us to find, and confirm, the similarities between the two.
The simultaneous examination of both machine- and human-proofs provides an important check on our
claims on the epistemic status of mathematical knowledge. Human mathematicians may plausibly have
introspective access to the ways in which they come to believe something, but there is no guarantee that they
match the actual reasoning process itself. Machines, through expansions that are orders of magnitude larger
than the self-reported steps in the corresponding human case, make visible what is idealised and implicit in
human communication. Despite the vast technological gulf between them, the machine-aided proofs of the
twenty-first century share, as we shall see, the same basic epistemic properties as Euclid’s.
3 Results
We present our results in three sections. First, the topological properties of the proof networks; second, the
emergence of epistemic phase transitions and the existence of modular firewalls; and finally, the abductive
paradox.
3.1 Network Structure
Fig. 1 presents four examples of the proof networks we use in this analysis, with modules identified by the
Girvan-Newman algorithm coloured, and with node size indicating out-degree. Fig. 2 shows the in- and
out-degree distributions for the machine proof of the Four Color Theorem and G odel’s First Incompleteness
Theorem. While in-degree (i.e., the number of prior nodes a particular claim depends on) is exponentially
distributed, the out-degree (i.e., the number of nodes that use that claim) is has a heavy-tailed distribution,
with a fraction of nodes having influence hundreds of times larger than average. This heavy-tailed distribution
follows a power-law, with the probability of a node having degree d given by
P (d) ∝ d−α.
Across our sample of both machine and human proofs, these α values cluster tightly around two (Table 1; fit
using the methods of Ref. (36)). This pattern, of both an exponential distribution for in-degree, and the
particular value of α for the out-degree power-law tail, is a characteristic sign of the generative assembly
model of Ref. (37, 38). This construction process has two steps: first, a new node chooses some number of
nodes to depend upon; second, from that set of chosen nodes, it chooses to link to some of their dependencies
in a probabilistic fashion. It is found in both cultural and biological systems governed by successive accretion
of links in a distinctive pattern associated with opportunistic tinkering and reuse (39).
3.2 Epistemic Phase Transitions and Modular Firewalls
As described in Materials and Methods, we look for epistemic phase transitions as a function of both deductive
and abductive implication strength: the degree to which the truth of a claim is coupled to the truth of either
a claim it depends on, or a claim that it implies. We parameterize these by two terms, βdep and βimp, for the
two pairwise effects of truth (or falsehood).
On the abductive side, exp (2βimp) is the multiplicative factor by which a correct implication makes the
node more likely to be true; on the deductive side, exp (2βimp), the multiplicative factor by which a correct
deduction makes the node more likely to be true (see Materials and Methods for discussion of alternative
choices). Taking (for simplicity) a symmetric error-making model, where the probability of incorrectly drawing
a false conclusion from a true premise is the same as drawing a true conclusion from a false premise (and
respectively for the abductive case), β implies an error rate  of
 = 11 + e2β ,
which corresponds to the error rate of Hume’s original paradox.
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Figure 1: Implication structure for four proof networks in our database. Clockwise from top left: the
Four Color Theorem (Coq), the uncountability of the Reals (Coq), Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem
(Coq), and Euclid’s Geometry (original Greek Text). We color the top clusters by membership, and size
nodes according to out-degree (i.e., the number of nodes that have that node as a deductive pre-requisite).
Both human and machine-aided proofs are characterized by high levels of modularity, and a heavy-tailed
distribution of out-degree.
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Theorem Nodes α f2 ∆L1
Machine-Aided
Euclid’s Geometry 174,597 2.14± 0.02 0.985 +11
1st Gödel Incompleteness 28,984 1.98± 0.04 ? +13
Bertrand’s Ballot 24,137 2.22± 0.05 0.998 +13
Polyhedron Formula 23,750 2.22± 0.04 0.988 +13
Euler’s FLiT 22,444 2.24± 0.05 0.998 +11
Bertrand’s Postulate 22,434 2.09± 0.04 ? +15
F.T. Algebra 20,431 2.29± 0.05 ? +14
Subsets of a Set 20,205 2.13± 0.05 ? +9
Pythagorean Theorem 18,230 1.93± 0.04 ? +19
Desargues’s Theorem 18,213 1.99± 0.04 0.987 +18
Taylor’s Theorem 17,809 2.20± 0.05 ? +13
Heron’s Formula 17,487 2.04± 0.04 ? +17
F.T. Calculus 16,845 2.24± 0.05 ? +13
Binomial Theorem 16,314 2.11± 0.05 0.998 +16
Geometric Series 16,160 2.16± 0.05 ? +14
Wilson’s Theorem 16,120 2.09± 0.05 ? +12
Sylow’s Theorem 15,942 2.16± 0.05 ? +12
Ceva’s Theorem 15,279 2.11± 0.05 0.99 +17
Bezout’s Theorem 14,909 2.23± 0.06 0.998 +15
Reals Uncountable 14,574 2.31± 0.05 0.996 +14
Int. Value Theorem 14,467 2.09± 0.06 0.998 +12
Quadratic Reciprocity 14,397 2.07± 0.06 0.998 +13
Triangle Inequality 13,657 2.14± 0.06 0.998 +15
Leibniz pi 13,619 1.91± 0.05 0.986 +16
Pythagorean Triples 13,254 2.19± 0.06 ? +14
Rationals Denumerable 13,108 2.22± 0.06 0.998 +13
Isosceles Triangle 13,055 2.11± 0.05 0.995 +15
Div 3 Rule 13,037 2.22± 0.06 0.998 +14
Inclusion-Exclusion 12,886 2.15± 0.06 ? +16
Cauchy-Schwarz 12,647 2.13± 0.05 ? +14
Four Color Theorem 12,407 1.97± 0.06 0.989 +10
Factor & Remainder 11,815 2.16± 0.05 0.997 +13
Birthday Paradox 11,692 2.10± 0.06 ? +14
Liouville’s Theorem 11,645 2.31± 0.06 ? +13
Cayley-Hamilton 11,407 2.09± 0.05 ? +15
F.T. Arithmetic 11,362 2.13± 0.06 ? +12
Cubic Solution 11,271 1.88± 0.05 0.986 +17
GCD Algorithm 10,792 2.26± 0.07 0.932 +14
Cramer’s Rule 10,613 2.09± 0.05 ? +15
Subgroup Order 10,583 2.23± 0.06 ? +14
Mean Value Theorem 10,168 2.20± 0.07 ? +13
Ramsey’s Theorem 7,747 2.37± 0.09 0.997 +13
Schroeder-Bernstein 1,331 2.21± 0.19 0.987 +14
Triangle Angles 739 2.38± 0.19 0.99 +11
Powerset Theorem 282 2.41± 0.32 0.992 +10
Prime Squares 250 2.25± 0.29 0.983 +10
Pascal’s Hexagon 150 2.32± 0.34 0.992 +9
Induction Principle 40 — 0.955 n.d.
Human
Euclid’s Geometry 475 1.97± 0.07 ? +21
Apollonius’s Conics 446 2.28± 0.11 ? +12
Spinoza’s Ethics 572 2.44± 0.10 0.906 +11
Wiles’s FLT 142 3.39± 0.72 0.941 +5
Table 1: The statistics of dependence and implication in machine- and human-proved theorems (F.T.:
“Fundamental Theorem”; FLiT: “Fermat’s Little Theorem”). Both are characterized by high levels of
modularity, and a long, power-law tail associated with assembly-and-tinkering construction. Over the entire
dataset, machine proofs have a α equal to 2.15± 0.13. f2: average degree of belief in final theorem at one-step
error rate of 10−2; ? indicates f2 > 0.999. ∆L1: log-likelihood penalty to within-module flip at β equal to
unity. Networks are truncated to the first depth expansion that produces more than 10,000 nodes, where
possible otherwise to maximum depth. 6
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Figure 2: Distribution of in- (+/dashed fit) and out-degrees (·/solid fit) for nodes in the automated proof
of the Four Color Theorem and for G odel’s First Incompleteness Theorem. While any node depends on a
small number of others, following an exponential distribution, the usage of a node in further claims follows a
heavy-tailed distribution, with power-law index α around two.
Fig. 3a shows epistemic phase transitions in action for three proofs; Cantor’s theorem on the uncountability
of the Reals (Coq, N = 14, 574), the Four Color Theorem (Coq, N = 12, 407), and the (arbitrarily chosen)
Proposition IX.36, the form of perfect numbers, of Euclid’s Geometry with dependencies taken from the
original Greek text (N = 475). For simplicity in this case, we have set βdep equal to βimp, and pprior equal to
0.75. We plot three quantities: the average degree of belief over all steps of the proof, the average degree
of belief in the final theorem, and the average degree of belief in the axioms. The three proofs in question
show different certainty structures (for example, belief in the full proof lags that of both the theorem and
axioms in the Euclidean case, while the reverse is true for the Four Color Theorem and the uncountability of
the Reals), but share an overall pattern. At cognitively-plausible error rates, the graph structure leads to a
sharp transition where high levels of certainty emerge even when when error rates are at levels that would
invalidate proofs made by deductive reasoning alone.
Column three of Table 1 shows f2, the average degree of belief in the theorem (i.e., the terminal node) at a
one-step error rate  of 10−2. The majority reach near-unity levels of f2 that exceed the one-step confidence.
There are a few cases where this does not happen (e.g., Desargues’s Theorem); this appears to be due, in
part, to the presence of nodes just below the final theorem that have both few dependents and no other
implications—these dangling assumptions participate only weakly in the larger network of justification.
Fig. 3b shows the effect of shifting pprior. Past the critical point, even weak priors can lead to the transition
to deductive certainty; in the physics-style language of phase transitions, this is the finite-size analogue of a
divergence in the susceptibility. Failure in the case of weak priors is due to the emergence of domain walls,
i.e., localized parts of the network that freeze into all-false or all-true states. This can lead either to (1) a
cascade into the all-false condition driven by the small-number statistics of the fluctuations, or (2) a long-lived
metastable state because interconnections are insufficiently strong to generate global consensus. Modular
structure, which we discuss now, allows a practicing reasoner to escape the metastable state.
In particular, the resolution of our data allows us to characterize how modular structure creates topological
“firewalls” where different parts of a proof to decouple from each other. We compute the relative log-likelihood
penalty to flip all the nodes in a module to the opposite truth value, versus, on the other, flipping the same
7
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3: Top: Epistemic phase transitions in three theorems: Cantor’s theorem on the uncountability of the
Reals, the Four Color Theorem, and Theorem IX.36 (the form of perfect numbers) in Euclid’s Geometry. Solid
lines indicate average degree of belief over all steps of the proof; dashed lines, in the theorem itself; dotted
lines, in the axioms. Bottom: the relationship between prior and posterior, after equilibrating to the heuristic
model, at an inference error rate of 0.01. This error rate puts all three proofs past the phase transition point,
and this means that even weak priors lead to near-unity degrees of belief. Remnant uncertainty at priors close
to 0.5 is due in part to frustrated freeze-in, i.e., where modules fall separately into all-true or all-false states.
8
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Figure 4: Average degree of belief in four theorems and their preconditions, as a function of abductive and
deductive error rates. Network structure leads to levels of confidence far in excess of what can be expected
on the basis of a linear derivation chain. For fixed deductive (abductive), but rising abductive (deductive)
confidence, contours turn over, leading to an abductive paradox driven by an imbalance in the two modes of
reasoning.
number of nodes randomly chosen across the whole graph. We characterize this using ∆L1, the log-likelihood
penalty per nodes flipped, with the number of nodes set to ten and β set to unity.
At high error rates, firewalls are fragile because there is little opportunity for order to propagate at any
distance. However, as error decreases and order emerges, the distinct effects of within-module versus cross-
module flips become apparent: the tighter connections between nodes within a module makes them easier to
shift to the opposite state. As mathematicians increase their confidence their confidence in a proof, they
find they can first achieve confidence in a particular module of the derivation even in the absence of strong
beliefs about the truth in other places. This means that a modular proof strategy is easier than one that
involves different parts of the system. Table 1 we list the ∆L1 values, where a positive value indicates that
within-module flips are more likely than cross-module ones. Values are around +10, corresponding to an
overwhelming preference (at the e+100 level) for within-, rather than cross-, module flips.
3.3 The Abductive Paradox
Fig. 4 shows four examples of our final result: that, at a fixed level of deductive power, increasing abductive
power can eventually lead to a degradation in the final degree of belief. In each case, for deductive (or
abductive) certainty beyond the transition point, we see the contours of contrast belief turn over. A vertical
(or horizontal) line drawn past the (rough) EPT point of  equal to 0.1 will eventually cross the contours
going downwards in certainty. Contour plots for all the theorems discussed can be found in the SI Appendix.
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4 Discussion
Our account of the emergence of mathematical belief depends on the use of paths that go both against and
with the deductive grain to generate an epistemic phase transition. While this poses a challenge to the purely
deductive model, the heuristics that underlie the EPT fit naturally with accounts that balance abduction and
deduction, allow intuition to play a role in the status of a claim without coming to dominate deduction, and
allow those intuitions to develop over time and in the course of examining a proof.
Consider, as an analogy, the use of computer code in a research project. Suppose I mostly believe some
fact A, and I write a complex computer program to check and increase my confidence in that belief. If the
program produces some output B that contradicts A, then I will likely first check the program itself for errors,
a move that corresponds to doubting the axioms, or earlier stages of reasoning, in abductive fashion. Later,
on reflection, I might realize that the output B is actually more intuitive than A; this will now have the
opposite effect, and act to increase my confidence in the earlier stages of the code even if I do no further
checks. Few theories of belief formation would rule out the analogous process in mathematical reasoning,
which is also found in informal accounts by practitioners (19). A more elaborate reflection on the relationship
between deduction and abduction, in the context of communication and social justification, is provided by
the mathematician and computer scientist Scott Aaronson.
[A] step-by-step logical deduction tends to be seen as merely the vehicle for dragging the
reader or listener, kicking and screaming, toward a gestalt switch in perspective—a switch
that, once you’ve succeeded in making it, makes the statement in question (and more besides)
totally obvious and natural and it couldn’t ever have been otherwise. The logical deduction
is necessary, but the gestalt switch is the point. This, I think, explains the feeling of
certainty that mathematicians express once they’ve deeply internalized something—they’re
not multiplying out probabilities of an oversight in each step, they’re describing the scenery
from a new vantage point that the steps helped them reach (after which the specific steps
could be modified or discarded). (40)
We emphasize that our results bear on real-world practice, rather than any underlying normative justification.
A theorem that contains a error in its logic may have little trouble deriving all sorts of (abductively) reasonable
conclusions, and thereby lead mathematicians to believe, incorrectly but explosively, in its truth. (It may be
the case that the kinds of errors that invalidate proofs, in ways that can not be fixed, have distinct topological
structures that prevent the emergence of an EPT. Such a determination requires a parallel database of invalid
proofs.)
That the path scaling required for an EPT can be achieved with a network structure associated with tinkering
and reuse suggests that the method of construction may itself aid in the method of justification. Such a
process fits qualitative accounts of how proofs are made. Lakatos’ dialectic model, for example, presented in
Proofs and Refutations, emphasises tinkering by making proof an embedding of the truth of a conjecture
into other areas of mathematics. The proof provides avenues for directed criticism, and both conjecture and
proof are co-modified in response to the incremental introduction of local and global counterexamples. The
structure of the final theorem is a product of this dynamic interplay.
Finally, our results allow us to draw some conclusions about the nature of proofs produced without machine
aid. In the case of Wiles’ proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem, for example, we see significant deviations from the
α equal to two power-law tail. This is due, in part, to a thinner network structure in which a text designed
for human communication neglects to explicitly mention its reliance on common axioms or lemmas at every
point they occur. This leads to a deficit of high-degree nodes whose absence frustrates an epistemic phase
transition because they are no longer available as “Grand Central Stations” that increase the number of
paths between points. A second example is Spinoza’s Ethics, the one non-mathematical text in our set,
which achieves slightly lower levels of overall certainty than others. The Ethics is devoted to a philosophical
account of the nature of matter and knowledge, albeit “in geometric order”, i.e., in an attempt to parallel the
deductive certainty of the arguments aimed at establishing mathematical facts.
We emphasize, however, that there are more commonalities than differences between the purely human case
and the machine-aided ones, even at the level of quantitative comparison. This suggests that systems like
Coq may be of use not just for verification and validation of mathematical claims, but also for their insight
into the nature of mathematical practice and cognition itself.
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5 Conclusion
Ever since their invention in a cultural context associated with new forms of justification (41), mathematical
proofs have provided us with some of the most explicit examples of human reasoning we have available. They
are an account, intended for use by other members of the community, of why we ought to believe something
that attempts to be immune, by its very explicitness, to every objection.
Seen in this way, proofs are a test-bed for justification practices more generally. Our results suggest that
the confidence provided by an epistemic phase transition may also be present, in latent form, in many other
kinds of claims we make in day-to-day life. As noted by Ref. (4), no piece of evidence—even one concerning
the evidence of the senses—is transparent, and we can always be called upon to situate it in the context of a
larger argument. This means that people expand claims about the physical world, or normative claims about
how things ought to be, when they are asked for further justification. Those expansions, if constructed via a
process similar to tinkering and reuse, ought to be able to support the same kinds of phenomena we establish
here.
The combination of modularity, abduction, and deduction, as well as the underlying assembly mechanism of
tinkering and reuse appears to have the power to generate significant levels of certainty even for complex and
apparently fragile arguments. The networks we have studied here may be something that we create when
called upon to justify our beliefs in non-mathematical claims as well.
The justification of beliefs through reason is a basic task of the human species. Mathematical proofs provide
an unusual example of what many cultures consider an ultimate standard. Our findings here suggest that
underlying features of that justification can lead to firm beliefs, even when we understand ourselves to be
fallible and limited beings.
6 Materials and Methods
Networks for machine proofs are drawn from https://madiot.fr/coq100/, which lists and locates Coq
formalizations of famous theorems; networks for the human proofs are built from standard editions.
6.1 Network Construction
Dependency networks for machine proofs are constructed from the abstract syntax trees of Gallina terms,
where Gallina is Coq’s specification language. Terms in Gallina correspond to proofs of the specification
given by the term’s type. Since our dependency graphs are derived from such terms, the existence of node
can be interpreted as asserting the existence of inhabitants of a particular type; e.g., “X is an object of type
‘Two is Even’.” Constructing X in this case corresponds to having a proof of the proposition that two is even,
via the Curry-Howard Correspondence. Types in Coq are based on the Calculus of Inductive Constructions,
a dependently typed lambda calculus. Hence types themselves can be parameterized by terms. For example,
a node in a Coq network might be a function F that takes a natural number X, a proof that X is even, and
returns a proof that X+X is even.
Here we will take such a proof that 4 is even and show an example transformation from Coq syntax to a
reified tree to a directed acyclic graph.
First we define evenness inductively — all even numbers are either zero or two greater than an even number.
Inductive ev : nat -> Prop :=
| ev_0 : ev 0
| ev_SS : forall n : nat, ev n -> ev (S (S n)).
Theorem ev_2 : ev 2.
Proof. apply (ev_SS 0 ev_0). Qed.
Then we prove that two even numbers sum to an even number by induction on the proof that the first
argument is even. This is combined with the previous proof that two is even into a proof that four is even.
Theorem add_even_even :
forall {n m : nat}, ev m -> ev n -> ev (m + n).
Proof.
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intros n m Hm Hn.
induction Hm.
{ simpl. apply Hn. }
{ simpl. apply ev_SS. apply IHHm. }
Qed.
Theorem ev_4 : ev 4.
Proof.
apply (add_even_even ev_2 ev_2).
Qed.
PrintAST ev_4 with depth 1.
In the last line we call our fork of University of Washington’s CoqAST plugin (https://github.com/
scottviteri/CoqAST). We substitute type constructor names for indexes into constructors, such as “S” for
“(Constr nat 1)”. To prevent blow-up in output size, we do not expand axioms or definitions of inductive
types.
{Lisp}
(Definition
Top.ev_4
(App Top.add_even_even
(App S (App S O)) ;2
(App S (App S O))
Top.ev_2
Top.ev_2))
If we print the AST to depth 2, we get the following:
{Lisp}
(Definition Top.ev_4
(App Top.add_even_even
(App S (App S O))
(App S (App S O))
Top.ev_2
Top.ev_2))
(Definition Top.add_even_even
(Lambda n_2 nat
(Lambda m_22 nat
(Lambda Hm_222 (App ev m_22)
(Lambda Hn_2222 (App ev n_2)
(App Top.ev_ind
...
))))))
(Definition Top.ev_2 (App ev_SS O ev_0))
When we print to a greater depth, we look for each definition that has not been elaborated and add its
definition as a top level tree, as demonstrated by Top.ev_4 and Top.add_even_even above. We assemble the
acyclic graph iteratively from these trees. We take every depth two subtree starting from the leaves, and check
if there is a match in the graph that has been built up so far. If there is no match, then the subtree is added to
the graph as a node with children. Inductively, no identical pieces of the tree will be added to the graph twice.
We add numbers to the names of new variables bindings to ensure we do have two identically-named variables
in the same scope, which might be otherwise be falsely unified during graph creation. This process turns the
tree into a directed acyclic graph that flows from axioms and definitions to increasingly high-level theorems.
The source code for this process is hosted at https://github.com/scottviteri/ManipulateProofTrees.
Fig. 5 shows the graph of the proof that four is even.
Networks for the human proofs are constructed by hand, using the references by the author (i.e., we include
a dependency only when it is explicitly named). For example, Proposition 9 of Book I (“I.9”) in Euclid’s
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Figure 5: The proof that 4 is even, represented as a directed acyclic graph
Geometry depends on Propositions I.1, I.3, and 1.8. Similarly, coding of Wiles’ proof of Fermat’s Last
Theorem uses only Wiles’ explicit remarks, e.g., in phrases such as “the first two conditions [of Theorem 3.1]
can be achieved using Lemma 1.12”.
6.2 Evidence Propagation
Each node in the proof tree is given a binary truth value. We model the (fallible) steps between claims in a
maximum-entropy fashion that fixes the average error rate of a deductive step but leaves the system otherwise
unconstrained (42). This corresponds to the Ising model,
P ({ti}) ∝ exp
β∑
i,j
Jijtitj
, (1)
where ti is the truth value of claim i (zero or one), the matrix Jij is non-zero when there is an evidentiary
link between them (i.e., when i invokes the truth of j as part of its justification), and β governs the reliability
of the connection between i and j; i.e., the extent to which the truth of j given i is believed to be correctly
inferred. We measure the perceived truth as the time-average of the node; i.e., if the heuristic observer
perceives the node to be true 70% of the time, the overall degree of belief is 0.7.
The statistical properties of this model can be simulated using the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) update rule as
a heuristic for belief update: a node shifts state (from believed-true to believed-false) depending on the state
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of its neighbours, and the strength of that influence depends upon β. We change this rule to account for
the differential impact of dependencies and implications, i.e., a different value of β depending on whether
the coupling is from i to j or from j to i. This leads to the asymmetric Ising model, where the effect of
A on B (all other things being equal) may not equal the effect of B on A, used in studies of updating in
game-theoretic contexts (43).
We write the strength of a dependence as βdep, and the strength of an implication is βimp (i.e., the extent to
which belief in a claim derivable from A abductively increases confidence in A). We begin our simulations
with a (weak) bias in favor of truth, here a weakly charitable predisposition for the reader to consider the
proof more likely to be true than false at the level pprior before considering evidentiary links. (It is possible
to consider scaling βdep with n, the number of dependencies, to capture the idea that a claim will cite only
those things necessary for the proof; because the distribution of dependencies is not very wide, however, this
amounts in practice to a simple rescaling.)
Finally, firewall strength, ∆L1 is defined as
1
|M |
(∑
i∈M
∆Ei − 〈∆Er〉
)
(2)
where M is the set of all nodes with assigned modules, ∆Ei is the change in energy (log-likelihood) when
all nodes in module i are flipped to the opposite state, and 〈∆Er〉 is the expectation value of the change in
energy when the same number of nodes are chosen randomly from all nodes with module assignments. These
are computed from simulations with the prior set to 0.5, which leads to modules freezing in to opposite states;
however, qualitative results are invariant to tilting the prior in favor of truth. We normalize this quantity to
the total number of nodes in the module to get the per-node penalty; this enables us to compare firewall
strengths across graphs with different numbers of nodes.
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